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The Rise of English Parliamentary
Government (1603-1789)

The century in which Richelieu and Louis XIV fashioned an
absolute dynastic state in France is noteworthy in English history for a very different reason. While the stage was being
set for Louis XIV to declare, if he wished, "I am the state,"
E-.ru;ilishmen wer_e._.es tablishj n ~ ±he p rinci..p_l.e_,_t hat all Yol j tical
authori
I
limited
a . This idea, which 1S ca l e c on~t1 .
na 1sm, was surely not new, having had its roots in
English, feudal, and medieval history . But, what is profoundly
si g nificant for Western Civilization is that this idea became
an operative political principle in late seventeenth century
England.
In the eighteenth century the English successfully
devised a frame of government which preserved the gains which
they had made earlier .

---

(

We have already seen that the death of Queen Elizabeth I
in 1603 left her successors in a perplexing situation. There
was a growing sentiment against the successful absolutist tendencies of the Tudors. There was dissatisfaction with the compromise religious settlement which Elizabeth had arranged.
Finally, because the rising level of prices had rendered the
customary royal revenues increasingly inadequate to balance
expenditures, and because the queen was loath to request new
taxes from Parliament, the treasury was empty .
The successor of the Virgin Queen was a Stuart cousin,
twice removed, who ruled as James VI in Scotland and as James I
in England (1603-1625).
For more than a century his Tudor predecessors had studiously avoided making a frontal attack on the
powers of Parliament . They accepted the principle that l aws
are made b the kin and Par ~e~, acting together, and tried
to control that body without making t e1r an more obvious
t~an was absolutely necessary.
This was a policy which required great perseverance and tact, qualities for which James
Stuart was not distinguished.
J ames brought with h i m f~om
Scotland the conviction
·
·
w~
tne on y
lg itimat
ru
rder ~ form of
ove
ent, and that therefOEe
parliaments should play a role distinctly i nferior to the king.
When Parliament refused t o g rant the new revenues whi ch he requested, James proceeded to scrape money together as best he
could. His rei gn was a succession of battles with Parliament,
which he dissolved whenever it opposed him.
His efforts to
control the judiciary led Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) , chief
justice of the Court of Common Pleas, to resurrect the halffor g otten Mag na Carta and proclaim that it stood in the way of
the king's efforts to exceed his lawful authority.
James' political views also brought him into immediate
conflict wi t h the Protestant dissenters in England. When a
group of persons wishing to reform the Ang lican church conferred
with him to propose certain changes along Pur itan lines (1604),
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James sputtered : "I shall make them confor m themselves or I
will harry them out of the land, or else do worse." The Puritans wished to introduce Calvinist theolo gy, simplify ritual,
and eliminate episcopacy from the Church of England . The king
had read his Hooker : every man is a member of the English commonwealth and also of the Church of England . He drew from this
the conclusion that anyone who wished to make innovations in
the religious settlement must also harbor designs against the
monarchy itself . "No bishop, no king," he declared. Religious
dissent was thus equated with political disloyalty.

(

Outright violence was averted during the reign of James I.
It soon became evident that his son, Charles I (1625-1649), was
equally determined to be free of le g islative control. When
Parliament voted him certain revenues fo r one year only instead
of for his entire reign, as had been customary in the past, arid
when it condemned his favante minister, the king dissolved it.
In 1628, in return for a g rant of f u nds f r om another Parliament,
Charles agreed to si g n the Petition of Ri~~t .
In subscribing
to this docu ment he promised not to levy taxes without the consent of Parliament, not to quarter soldiers in private homes or
establish martial law in peacetime, and no t to order arbitrary
arrests . Englishmen now consider the Petition of Right one of
the foundation stones of their libert ~ almost on a par with
Magna Carta . But Charles felt scarcely more bound by it than
John felt bound by the earlier document . He soon dissolved
Parliament and ruled England without it for a per1o
eleven
years {1629-1640).
It is certain that, during this interval, Charles did not
think of himself as a cruel tyrant, entitled to vent his passions on the English people . Nor did he expect them to think
thu s of him . ~e was the king chosen b God to rule En land,
and was now rulin it as--- o r
11 inten e t at it should
governed . T e k i ng worked hard and administere a a1rly hone s t and efficient government . He dar ed n o t impose new taxes
and, therefore, had to c u t expenses t o the bone and resort to
other devices to . obtain money . H~ sold monopolies on certain
basic co
.vived
er la sed feu d al law whicn his
~
ould discover ~olato r$ of whi c h e r e
e
eavily.
For example, it was once the duty of seab oar d towns to equ1p
naval vessels, but the custom had fallen into disuse . The king
revived and extended it, collecting "ship money" in lieu of the
former services. Meanwhile, Charles and his advisers made
changes in the worship of the Chur ch of Eng land which offended
and aroused the Puritans still further . Some 60,000 of them
left England for the New Wor ld.
A large numb er remained at
home, seething with discontent .
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but another had to be summoned befor e the e n d of 1640 , Given
the state of the cou ntr y, i t was i n e v itable t hat once in session earljame~ would make a strong a nd de t e r mined bid to limit
the king. Under the leade r ship of John Pym ( 1584-1643) and
others, some of Charlesw chief s u ppor te r s were impeached and
executed, and his finan c ial p r actices o f e leven years were
condemned , Pa liament fo r ced the king to discl ·
'rrht to
dis
ve it and
owledge that f uture Par liaments should
least o ce
t bJ;:_ee e. r , I n r etur n, he was
money to meet the Scottish inv a s i on , Meanwhile, rebroke out in Ireland , Char les pau sed in his campaign
against the Irish long enough to commi t a n i r r eparable blunder.
In 1642 , when Parliament was momentarily divi ded on the quest ion of how far to limit the ki ng , he ent e r ed the House of
Commons at the head of some troops t o a r rest f ive of its members who wer e his outspoken opponent s , The a t t emp t having
failed, he issu ed a c a ll to a r ms a gai ns t Par l i ament , In reply,
Parl i amen t began p a ssi n g laws wi
oyal a ppr o v al and r aised
forces of its own , This meant c i v il wa r ,

(

By no means al l Englishmen d e s e r t e d t h e ki n g , In general,
Anglicans and Catholics , who included mos t o f the nobi lity,
rallied to his s u ppor t , The opposi ti on c ame mostly from the
south and east of England and cons i s t e d p r i ma r i ly of religious
dissidents who, it happens, cons t itut ed a lar ge par t of the
middle class , It i s al t oge t her appr opr iat e t o c onsider the
English Civil War one of the re ligiou s war s , fo r by now the
political and r eli g ious opposi t ion wh i c h c onfr on t ed James I at
the beginning of the c entu ry h a d c oalesced in t he Pur itan movement ,
mi l i t ar defeat at the hands
I n 1644 the k i ng s u f _
of h i s o ponen s ,
he par liamentary major J. ·y , - ich had alr eady made mode r at e changes in the Angli can c hur ch along Presbyterian lines, was ready to end the war u pon the king ' s promise
to accept the pol it i cal a nd r eligi ou s si t uati on as it then
stood , Howev e r 1 the army n ow ent e r e d the p i ctu re and prevented
a ny s uch se t tlement f r om taki n g p lac e , The mil i t a r y leaders
wer e hostile bo t h to t he Pr esb yt e r i a n moder ate s in control of
P a rliament and· t o t h e ki ng , They defe at e d Ch ar les in battle
and he s urrende r ed i n 1646 , Then i n 1648 t h e army pur ged the
Hou se of Commons of a ll but i t s mor e rad ical member s , What remaine d si t ting wa s the "R1l.Ullp Par l iame n t , " whi ch p r oceeded to
e x ecu t e the king ( 1649 ) and d e clar e t h a t Engl a n d was now a commonweal t h having ne it her k i ng n o r l o r d s ,
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England then passed to a fo r m of gove r nment known as ~he
Pro_te eto :t:.at _e..- A wr1 t ten cons t i tu t 1on , the I ns trument o f Government, was drawn up ( 1653), si g nificant becau se it was the first
such document of modern times and the only one the English ever
t r ied . The Instrument of Government made Cr omwell lord protector for life , established a u nicamer al par liament, and made
Calvinism with a congregational polity the state r eligion . This
constitution failed to provide England wi t h the anticipated
regular government . No mor e successful than we r e his predecessors with their legislatures, Cromwell soon dissolved Parliament
and eventu ally ruled as a military dictator . His control of
the army kept him in power unt i l his de a th i n 1658 .
In spite
of his effor t s, he had failed t o ge ner a t e mu ch popu lar enthusiasm fo r the Puritan settlement , Gener al p r osper ity at home and
a popular anti-Spani sh and anti-Du tch policy abr oad help explain
why there were no serious attempts to overt h r ow the dictatorship
du ring Cromwell ' s lifetime .
There was no one to replace the lor d p r o t ector in 1658.
His son succeeded him but soon abdicated . Ne gotiations were
then begun to call back Par liament, which declared that "the
gover nment is and ought to be by King , Lor ds , and Commons."
The monarchy was recalled in the per son o f the son of Charles I,
who was proclaimed king as Charles II in 1660 . The Re~toration
had begun .
In the midst of the Civil War an English philosopher and
t u tor who had fled to France completed a modest-sized volume
which has become one of the most influential political writings
of moder n times . Thomas
bbes ( 1588-1679 ) , by his own admission, was a timid an
ear ful man . He at t ribu ted these traits
to his mother 1 s fri g ht just p r ior to his prematu re birth 9 upon
hear ing of the impending a r rival o f t he Spa nish Armada . Hobbes
lived thr oug h · times which were f u ll of t u rmoil at home and
abroad . He and fear , Hobbes once wr o t e, like twins, were born
tog ethe r.
Law and order were par ticul a r ly appealing to him.
Hobbes was deeply interes~
ili sical sciences .
He
had contacts with such men as Fr ancis Bacon, Gali1eo, and Descar tes . He thought of himself as a mathemat i cian and scientist,
an opinion challenged both during h i s l ifetime and
He
was convinced that o
u ht wou ld have to
the
method of the h sical sciences if it wer e to
a ccura_e . Hobbes accepted t e seven een
cen
~anal ysis of the universe in which natur e and man -- all things
-- consisted of only matter and motion . The fi r st
Lev i athan ( 1651) , there f ore, is an int r odu c t i on to
t e eve
of a theor
of sycholog which is
y_hy sics . ._
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as James I, but

(
?C1entific anaJ y sis ~ hy man nat ure . He described man as he
saw h 1m in an abst r act or fictitious state of nature and then
took the idea of a contract, which i n itself went far back into
the Middle Ag es, · as the instrument throug h which society and
g overnment come into existence , Because of the dreadful alternative to government -- war and the decay of society, as
Hobbes saw it -- there was no real justification for ever breaking the contract, as the Eng lish had done .
The Leviathan was widely read at the time it appeared and
has been the subject of much debate for thr ee centuries. Men
who have not accepted the Hobbesian evaluation of human nature
or agr eed with his explanation of the social contract have
often felt compelled to use Hobbes as a star ting point for their
own interpretations ,
PART I . Of Man
Chapter VI
Of the Interior Beginnings of Vol u ntar y
Motions; commonly called the Passions;
and the Speeches by which they are expressed

(

(

There be in animals, (two sorts of motion~ peculiar
to them : one called vital; be gun in gener ation, and continued without inter rup t 1on th r oug h thei r whole life;
such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the
breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc.,
to which motions there needs no help of imagination:
the
other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion;
as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such
manner as is first fancied in our minds , That sense is
motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body,
caused by the action of the thing s we see, hear , etc.;
and that fancy is but the relics o f the same motion, remaining afte r sense, h a s been al r eady seen in the first
and second chapters , And because going, speaking, a rid
the like voluntar y motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the ima ination is the f irst internal beginnin of all v ary mo 1on ,
a
oug ur.tsf"Ucf:ied men
do not conceive any mo 1 n t all to be there, where the
thing moved is invisible; o r the space it is moved in is,
for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not
hinder, but that s u ch motions a r e , For let a space be
never so little, that which is moved over a greater space,
whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over
that , These small beginning s of motion, within the body
of man, before they appear i n walking , speaking, striking
and other visible actions, are common ly called endeavour.
This endeavour, when it is towar dsomethin g which
causes it, is called appetite, o r desire; the latter,
being the g eneral name; and the other oftentimes restrained
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to signify the desire of good, namely hunger and thirst.
And when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called aversion . . , , For Nature itself does often
press upon men those t r uths, which afterwards, when they
look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at.
For
the schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no
actual motion at all:
but becau se some motion they must
acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion; which is
but an absurd speech : for though words may be called
metaphorical, bodies and motions c a nnot .
That which men desire, they are also said to love:
and to hate those things for which they have aversion.
that desire and love are the same thing; save that by
( desire, we always s ign ify the absence of the object; by
love most commonly the presence of the same.
So also by
aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object .
~ Of appetites and aver sio ns, some a r e born with men;
as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration,
which may also and more p r oper ly be called aversions,
from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some other
appetites, not many . The rest, wht c h are appetites of
particular things, proceed from exper ience , and trial of
their effects upon themselves or other men . For of
things we know not at all, o r believe not to be, we can
have no further desire than to taste and try.
But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt
us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us,
or n ot .
Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we
are said to contemn ; -ontem t b · o- no..tb.ing._e.lse b:ut an
immobiliX~, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the
·ac~ion of certain things; and proceeding from that the
heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent
objects i of f r om want of experience of them .
And because the constitution of a man's body is in
continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same
things should always cause in him the same appetites and
aversions : much less can all men consent, in the desire
of almost any one and the same object .
But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite
or desi r e, that ·is it which he for his part ca+leth good:
and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his
contempt, vile and inconsiderable.
For these words of
good, evil, and contemptible, are e v er u sed with relation
· to the person that useth them : there being nothing simply
and absolutely so ; nor any common r u le of good and evil,
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves;
but from the person of the man, whe re there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the pe r son that representeth it ; or from an arbitrat or o r judge, whom men
disagr eeing shall by consent set u p, and make his sentence the ru le thereof .. ..
As, in sense, that which is re ally within us, is, as
I have said befor e, only motion, caused by the action of

~
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external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light
and colour; to the ear, sou nd; to the nostril, odour,
&c. : so, when the action of the same object is continued
from the eyes, ears, and othe r organs to the heart, the
real effect there is nothing but motion, or .endeavour;
which consisteth in appetite, or ave r sion, to or from the
object moving , But the appearance, or sense of that motion is that we either call delight, or t r ou ble of mind .
This motion, which is called appetite, and for the
apparence of it delight , and pleasure, seemeth to be a
corrobor ation of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and
therefore s u ch things as caused deli g ht, were not improperly called jucunda,
j u vando, from helping or fortifying; and the contrary-molesta, offensive, f r om hindering, and trou bling the motion vital .
fi
Pleasure therefore, or delight, is the apparence,
)
' Or sense of good; and molestation , or displeasu re, the ap/ par ence, or se n se of evil , And consequently all appetite,
desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more
or less ; a n d all hat r ed and ave r sion, wi t h mor e or less
displeasure
and offence.
.
\
Of pleasures 9r delights, some a r ise from the sense
of an object present; and those may be called pleasure of
sense; the word sensu al, as it is ~ ~ftd by those only that
condemn them, having no place tilf -t he r e be laws. Of this
kind a r e all onerations and exonerations of the body; as
also all that is pleasant, in the sight, hear ing, smell,
taste, or touch . Other s arise from the expectation, that
proceeds from fo r esight of the end, or consequ ence of
things; whether those things in the sense please or displease . And these are pleasu res of the mind of him that
draweth those consequences, and are generally called joy.
In the like manner, displeasures are some in the sense,
and called pain ; othe r in the expectation of consequences,
and a r e called grief .. . ,

a

l

Chapter XII I
As of the Natur al Condition of Ma nkind as
conce r ning thei r Fe licity a n d Mise r y

Jat l'l r e ~a d c men sa e gua + , _in t he faculties o - he //, 4~
bgdy · and ·
· as that thou gh th
_ mm _ o.n_e _ a some- ~~
1mes manifestly s t ronger i n body , o r o f qu Lcker mind
~~
J»~ er
et when all is r eckoned together, the dif
·
fe n c between man and man 1 is not so considera ~ . as
that one man can thereu pon claim to himself any benefit,
to which another may not p r etend 9 a s well as he . For as
to the st r ength of body, the weakest has s trength enough
to kill the strongest, ei t her by secr et machination, or
by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger
with himself .
An d as to the facul t ies of t he mind, se t ting aside
the arts g r ounded upon words, and especially that skill of
proceeding u pon general and infallibl e -ru les, called science; which very few have, and bu t in a f ew things; as
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being not a native faculty, born with u s; nor attained,
as pru dence, while we look a f ter somewhat else, I find
yet a g reater equality amongst men than that of strength.
For prudence is but experience; which equ al time, equally
bestows on all men , in those things they equ ally apply
themselves un t o , That which may pe r haps make such equality incredible, is but a vain concei t of one's own wisdom, _
which almost all men think they have in a greater degree
than the vu l gar; t hat is, than all men bu t themselves,
and a few others, whom by fame o r fo r concurring wit h
themselves, they approve . For such is the nature of men,
that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be
more witty, or more eloquent, o r mor e lear ned; yet they
will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves;
for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a
distance . But this proveth rathe r that men are in that
point equ al, than u nequ al , For the r e is not ordinarily a
g reate r si g n of the equ al distr i bu t i on of a nyth i ng, than
that every man is contented with his s har e .
Fr om this equality of ability ~a r iseth equ ality of
hope in the attaining of our ends , And ther efore if any two
men desire the same thing , which neve r theless they cannot
both enjoy , they become enemies; and in the way to their
end, which is principally their own conser vation, and
sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy or
subdue one another . And from henc e i t comes to pass, that
where an invader hath no more to fe ar than another man's
single powe r ; if one plant, sow, build, o r possess a convenient seat , others may p r obably be expected to come
prepar ed with fo r ces u nited, to dispossess and deprive
him, n~ only of the f ru it of his labou r , but also of his
life or liberty . And the i nvade r again is in the like
danger of anothe r.,,.
So that in the natu re of man, we find three principa
uses of qu a rre l.
First, competition; secondly; diffince; thi r dly, glory .
The fi r st, maketh men i n vade fo r ga in; the second,
fo r safety; and the third, fo r r epu tation . The first use
violence, to make t hemselves mas t ers of other men's persons, wives, children, and c attle ; the second, to defend
them; the third, fo r t ri fles, as a wor d, a smile, a different opinion , and any other si g n of u nde r val u e , either
di r ect in their per son s, or by r e f le c tion in their kindred,
thei r f r ie n ds, thei r nation, t hei r p r ofession, or their
name .
~
He r eby is manifest. that du ring the t ime men li lZE~nf! ·-Jd~:;;
wl thou t a common power to keep them all in awe, they are
~~rr~
tha t condition which i s called war; and s u c h a war, as i ~ r~.
o ! every man, aga1ns t eve r y man . For war consisteth not {- ~~~
in a tle o
,
e act of fighting; bu t in a tract of ~~!
time, wherein the will to contend by battle is s u fficiently
known ~
and the r efor e the notion of t i me is to be considered in the nature of war, as it i s in the natu re of
weather . For a s the natu re of fou l we a the r lieth not in
a shower o r two of r ain, bu t i n an inclina t ion thereto of
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many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not
in actual fi g hting , bu t in the known disposition thereto
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.
All other time is peace.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war,
where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention
shall furnish them withal.
In s u ch condition there is no
place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain,
and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation,
nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea;
no commodious building; no instru ments of moving and removing such thing s as require mu ch fo r ce; no knowledge of
the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts, no
letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continu~l~
.
fear and dange r of violent death ; and the life of m~ ~~
solitar~. poor, nasty, b ru tish, and shor t ,
~- /
~
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well
weighed these things, that Nature shou ld thus dissociate,
and render men apt to invade and dest r oy one another; and
he may therefore, not t r u sting to this inference, made
from the passions, desire perhap s t o have the same confirmed by expe r ience . Let him the r efor e consider with
himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks
to go well accompanied; when g oing to sleep, he locks his
doprs; when even in his house, he locks his chests; and
this when he knows there be laws, and p u blic officers,
armed, to reveng e all inj ur ies shall be done him; what
opinion he has of his fellow-s u bjects, when he rides armed;
of his fellow-citizens, when he locks his doo r s; and of
his children and servants, when he locks his chests.
Does
he not there as mu ch accuse mankind by his actions as I do
by my words? But neither of us accu se man's nature in it.
The desires and other passions of man are in themselves
no sin . No mor e are the actions that p r oceed from those
passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which
till laws be made they c annot know, no r can any law be
made till they have agr eed u pon the pe r son that shall make
it . .. .
~o this war of every man, against eve r y man, this also
is coliS"equent; that noth1ng can be unjust . ~he notions of
right and wrong, j u stice and inj u stice , hav~ there no
place . Whe r e there is no common power, there is no law)
where no law, no injust ~
· e.
For ce and f raud, are in war
the two cardinal virtue s .
ustice a
· ·
·ce are none
of the faculties neithe of the body nor mind .
If they
were, they might be in a man that wer e alone in the world,
as well as his senses, and passions . They are q 11al j tieit
that re ate to men in society, no . in so i ude.
It is
consequent also to lie same condition, that the r e be no
propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but
only that to be every man 1 s that he can g et; and for so
long, as he can keep it . And thu s much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actu ally pl a ced in;
_A£~~ ~IZ q~~,
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though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting
p artly in the p assions, partly i n his reason.
-~~
b~e~p~a~s~s~i~o~n~s~t~
h~a~t~l~
·n~
c~l~i~n~e~m~
e~n~t~o~~~~~a.~-f~e~
a~r~
~f ?d~~ ~death; desire of such things
-: z~;~~~mo d lous lVlng · an a 10pe
em.
And reason sug gesteth
p eac e, upon which men may be drawn to a g reement. These
articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of
Nature:. ) ,
Chapter XIV
Of the First and Second Natural Laws,
and of Contracts
The ri g ht of Na:t.yre, which writers commonly call jus
na tur le, is thJ liber.t~
a.Gll-ma
a.:tlJ. , to use h ·
n-p~, as ~ ll himself, o
he preservation of his
Qw.
atu e; that iS to say, of his own 1fe; and con""sequently, of doing anything , which in his own judgment
and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means
thereunto .
.
By liberty, is understood, according to tpe proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments: which impediments may oft take away part of a man's
power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from
using the power left him, according as his judgment and
reason shall dictate to him.
A l aw of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or general r ule, found out by-reason, by which a man 1S forbidden to do t n a t which is destructive of his life, or
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit
that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For
thou g h they that speak of this subject, use to confound
jus and lex, ri g ht and law:
yet they oug ht to be distingllTshed;-oBcause ri g ht , consisteth in liberty to do, or
to forbear; whereas law, determineth and bindeth to one
of them; so that law and right differ as much as obli g ation and liberty; which in one and the same matter are
inconsistent .
And because of the condition of man, as hath been decl red in the precedent chapter, is a condition of war of
e ery one against every one; in which case every one is
overned by his own reason; and there is nothing he can
ake use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life a g ainst his enemies; it followeth, that in
such a condition, every man has a ri g ht to everything;
even to one another ' s body.
And therefore, as long as
this natural ri g ht of every man to everything endureth,
,
there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise
~~ver he be, of living out the t i me, which Nature ordinarily alloweth to live.
And consequently it is a precept,
or general rule of reason, "that every man ou g ht to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and
when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all
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fu~damental l
ture;
and fo llJ
it~ The second, the
ID-.-O-"~:&a:e-~J..gru;_oL..N.a.tu~ :
which is, "by all means we
to defend ur.se.l:v.es . "
From this fundamental law of Nature, by which men are
commanded to endeavour peace , is der ived this second law;
"that a man be willing , when others are so too, as farforth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think
it necessary, to lay down this ri ght to all things; and be
contented with so much liberty a g ains t other men, as he
would allow other men against himself . " For as long as
every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh;
so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other
men will not lay down their r i ght, as well as he; then
there is no reason for any one to divest himself of his :
for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is
bou nd to, rather than to dispose himself to peace . This
is that law of the Gospel; "whatsoever you re uire that
others should do to you that do e to
"
ever a man t r ans err e h his right , or renounceth
it ; it is eithe r in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or fo~ some other good he
hopeth for thereby . For it is a voLuntar y act : and of
the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good
to himself . And therefore there be some rights, which no
man can be understood by any words, o r other signs, to
have abandoned or transferred . As fi r st a man cannot lay
down the ri ght of resisting them that assau lt him by
force, to take away his life; becau se he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to . himself. The same
may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment; both
because there is no benefit consequent to such patience;
as there is to the p atience of suffering another to be
wounded, or imprisoned; as also because a man cannot tell ,
when he seeth men proceed against him by violence , whether
they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive and
end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right
is introduced, is nothing else but the secu rity of a man's
person, in his life, and in the ~~ans of so preserving
life , as not to be weary of it . ~ d therefore if a man
by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the
end, for which those signs we r e intended; he is not to be
understood as if he meant i t , or that i t was his will; but
that he was igno r ~t of how such words and actions were
to ~ interpreted. )
The mutual transferring of ri ght , is that which men
cal
ontract . . ·)
~n

PART II . Of Commonwealth
Chapter XVII
Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition
of a Commonwealth

~he

final cause, end, or desi gn o f men, who naturally
and dominion over others, in the introduction

love ~ iberty,
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of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them
live in commonwealths, is the foresi g ht of their own
preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that
is to say, of g~ in g themselves out from that miserable
condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as
hath been shown
chapter xiii, to the natural passions
of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in
awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance
of their covenants, and observation of those laws of
Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.
For the laws of Nature, as justice, equity, modesty,
mercy, and, in sum, "doing to others, as we would be done
to," of themselves, without the terror of some power, to
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natu ral
passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, reveng e,
and the like. And covenants without the sword are
words, and of o s rength to secu re am
1 . Therefore notwithstandin g the laws o Natur e, which every one
hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when
he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or not
great enou gh for our security; every man will, and may
lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution
against all other men. And in all places, where men have
lived by small families, - to rob and spoil one another,
has been a trade, and so far from being repute_d against
the law of Nature, that the greater spoils they gained,
the greater was their honour; and men observed no other
laws therein, but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain
from cruelty, ~avin g to men their lives, and instruments
of husbandry. ~nd as small families did then; so now do
cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families, for
their own security enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of dang er, and fear of invasion, or assistance
that may be g iven to invaders, and endeavour as much as
they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open
force and secret arts, for want of other caution, ju,tly;
and are remembered for it in after ages with honour ~ .
+he only way to erect such a coromon p qwer. as may be
able t
end them from t
:nvasion of fore·
ers, ~
in ur1es o one
an
ere
e
em
in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the
fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly, is, to co fer all their QOWer and strength
~ ~
ne assem
men
a rna
d ce -t :~
plurality of vo1ces u nto o
~:
~p~
o say, o appoin one man,
assem- zt~~ 1 bly of men, to bear their person; and eve r y one to own,
~Y~~
and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that
so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted,
in those things which concern the common peace and safety;
and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will,
and their judgments, to his judgment , This is more than
consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in
one and the same person, made by covenant of every man
with every man, in such manner, as if every man should
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say to every man, "I authorize and g ive u p my right of
to this assembly of men,
u p thy ri g ht t o him, and
manner. " This done,
_ __....,...__,o~n~
e-PJ
call ed a cominon._
~Ms ·
he gene.r,..a :t.l. oll O:f : :tii oJI-~~
...;.::._;;~;::;:e
;;:r
:=:.:,,_ t o speak more reverently, oi- __../;t;;;U· ~
o
unde r the i
ortal G. . , . ~~
our
For y
is a u thority, g iven him ~~
tiy every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the ~~~
use of so much p ower and streng th confe r red on him, that
by terror the r eo f , he is enabled to perform the wills of
them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid a g ainst the i r
enemies abroad , And in him consisteth the essence of the
commonwealth ; which, to define i t, is "one person, of
whose acts a g reat multitude, by mutual covenants one
with another, have mad e themselves eve r y one the author,
to t h e end he ma y u se t he st r engt h and means of them all,
as he shall think e xp edient, for their p eace and common
defence . "
And he that carrieth this person is called sovereign,
and said to have soverei g n power; and e v ery one besides,
his subject.
The attaining t o this soverei g n p owe r is by two ways.
e, by natu ral f orce; as wh en a man maketh his childre
o s u bmit themselves, and their childr en, to his g overnment, as being able t o destroy t hem i f t hey r efuse; or by
war subdu eth his enem i es to his wi ll, g iving them their
lives on that condition.
The other is, when men a g ree
among st themselves to submi t to some man, or assembly of
men, volunt arily , on confidence to be p r otected by him
a g ainst all others.
This latter may be called a pol i tica
commonwealth , o r commonwealth by i nsti tu tion; and the
former, a commonwealth by acquis i ton . An d fi r st, I shall
speak of commonweal t h by institu tion.
Chapter XVII I
Of the Ri g hts of Sove r ei g ns by Institu tion
A commonwealth is said to be instituted, wh en a multitude of _men do a g ree , and covenant, eve r y one, with every
one, that to what soeve r man, o r assembly of men, shall be
g iven by the major p a r t, the ri g ht to p r esent the person
of them all, that is to say, to be thei r r epresentative;
every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted
a g ainst it, shall authorize all the act i ons and judgments,
of that man, or assembly of men, i n the same manner, as
if they were his own , to the end, to live p eaceably among st
t hemselves, and be protected a g ainst other men.
From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all
the ri g hts and faculties of him, or them, on whom sovereign
powe ~ is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.
(~irst, because they covenant , it is to be understood,
they ~re not bli g ed by former covenant to anything repugnant hereu nto
And consequently they that have already
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instituted a commonwealth, being ther eby bound by covenant,
to own the a c tions and judgments of one, cannot lawfully
make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to
any other , in any thing whatsoever , withou t his permission.
And the r efor e, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot
without his leave cast off monar chy, and r eturn to the
confusion of a disunited mu ltitu de; nor transfer their
person f r om him that bea~e th it, t o another man, or other
assembly of men; for they' are bound, every man to every
man, to ow~ , and be repu ted author of all, that he that
already is their sovereign, shall do, and j udge fit to be
done : so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should
break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice:
and they have also ever y man given the soye r eignty to him
that bear eth thei r person; and ther efor e ~f the~ depose
him, they take f r om him that whic
is own and so agai _
•
.
it ~s inju f?tice . . . .
1
-~ econdly, bec aus e the right of be a ri ng the person of
hem all, is given to him they make s over eign, by covenant
only of one to anot her , and not of him to any of them;
there can happen no br each of covenant on the part of the
sover eign : and consequ ently none of his s ubjects, by any
pretence of forfei t ur e, can be freed f r om his s ubjection ....
. . . The opinion that any monar ch r eceiveth his power
by covenant, that is to say, on condition , proceedeth from
want of under standing this easy t r uth, that covenants being
bu t wor ds and breath, have no force t o oblige, contain,
constr ain, or protec ~ any man, but what it has from the
public sword; that i s, from the united ha nds of that man,
or assembly of men that hath the sovereignty, and whose
actions a r e avou ~hed by them all, a nd per formed by t
·
strengt
h
of
them
all,
in
him
uni
tecf.
~
..
1
Thir dly, because the major part hath by consenting
voi ces declared a sover eign; he that dissented must now
~o ns en t with the r est; that is, be contented to avow all
the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed
r est ., . ,
Four thly, because every s ubject is by this institution
,
author of all the actions and j1Jdgments .of the sove~eign
( instituted, it -_ fQ~,Iows· , that wha tsoever he. doth .it ·.can \)»e
ilo .injury to. any of hi.:$ subjects, nor ought he . to· be by any
of them -accused of i njustice . , ., ·
.
.
Fifthly., and consequently to that which was said .
last, no man that hath sovereign power _can justly be ·p-ut . to
death, ·or otherwise in any manne;r by his subje.ct~ ;punishe4 .
For seeing every subject is auth<:>r of the, actions o'*f. ht's
sover eign, ·he punisheth another for the .a ctions committed
by himself . ~ , .
~~ it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge
of what opinions and doctrines are aver se .and what conducing to peace ; and consequently, on what occasions, how far,
and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the doctrines of
all books before they be published , For the actions of men
pr oceed from their opinions, and in the well governing of
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opinions consisteth the well- governing of men's actions,
in order to their peace and concord . And though in matter of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded but the
truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating the same
by peace . For doctrine repu g nant to peace can be no more
true than peace and concord can be a g ainst the law of
Nature . . . .
Seventhly, is annexed to the soverei g nty, the whole
power of prescribing the rules, whe r eby every man may
know what goods he may enjoy , and what actions he may do,
without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects; and
this is it men call propriety . .. .
Ei g hthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the ri~~t
of judicatu r e ; that is to say , of hearing and deciding
ai l controversies, which may arise concerning law, either
civil or natural, or concerning fact . . . .
N..inthl L is annexed to the soverei g nty, the r),.ght ...Q.f
making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths;
t fiat is to say, of judg ing when it is fo r the public good,
and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid
for that end; and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof . . ..
T~nthl , is annexed to the soverei g nty, the~
~
- counsellors ministers, mag ist t
and officers,
J toth i
12 ~~ nd. ar.
o r see1.ng the sovereign
charged with the end, which is the common peace and defence, he is understood to have power to use such means
as he shall think most fit for his discharge .
~' to the sovereign is committed :the power
of rewardi
with riches or honour, a~ d £6f punishing with
corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy ;' every
subject according to the law he hath formerly made; or if
there be no law made, accordin g as he shall judge most to
conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth, or deterring of them from doin g disservice to the
same .. . .
These are the ri g hts, which make the essence of sovereignty; and which are the marks whereby a man may discern
in what man, or assembly of men, the sovereign power is
placed and resideth . For these are incommunicable, and
inseparable. The power to coin money; to dispose of the
estate and persons of infant heirs; to have pre-emption in
markets; and all other statute prerogatives, may be transferred by the soverei gn; and yet the power to protect his
subjects be retained. But if he transfer the militia, he
retains the judicature in vain, for want of execution of
the laws : or if he grant away the power of raising money,
the militia is in vain; or if he g ive away the government
of doctrines, men will be fri g hted into rebellion with the
fear of spirits . And so if we consider any one of the
said ri g hts, we shall presently see, that the holding of
all the rest will produce no effect, in the conservation
of peace and justice, the end for which all commonwealths
are instituted.
And this division is it, whereof it is
said, "a king dom divided in itself cannot stand : "
for
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unless t hi s divi sio n precede, d i v isi on i nto o pposite armies can never hap p en .
I f there had not first b ee n an
opinion received o f t h e gr eatest part of England , that
these powers were divided between t he Ki n g , and t he Lords ,
and the House of Commons, the p eople h ad never been di vided and fallen into 'this civil war; f irst between those
that disag reed in politics; and after between the d i ssenters about the libe r ty of rel i g ion; which have so instructed men in this point of s overei g n ri g ht, that there
be few now in England that do not see that these rights
are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowled g ed at
the next return of p e a ce; and so cont inue, till their
miseries a r e for g ot t en; and no long e r, e x cept the vul g ar
be bette r taught than they have hithe rt o been .. . .
But a man may here obje ct, th at the c ond i t i on of subjects is very mi s erable ; as being obnox i ous to the lusts,
and othe r i rr e gular pass i ons o f him o r t hem t h a t have so
nlimited a power in t he ir hands . And c ommonly t hey that
live under a monarch, think it t h e fault of monarchy; and
they that l iv e nder the g ave nme n t of d emocracy , or other
soverei g n assembly, attribu te all the inconvenience t o
that form of commonwealth ; whereas the power in all forms,
if they be p erfect enou gh to protect them, is the same;
not considering that the sta t e of man can never be without some incommodity or othe r; and that t he greatest,
that in any f orm o f g ove r nment can p ossibly happen to the
people in general, is scar ce sensible, in respect of the
miseries, and ho r rible calami ti es, that accompany a civil
war , or tha t dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a coe r cive p ower to tie their
hands from rapine and revenge ~
nor considerin g that the
greatest pressure of soverei g n g overnors proceedeth not
from any deli g ht, or profit they can e xpect in the damag e
or weakenin g o f their subjects, i n who se vi g our consisteth
their own st r en g t h and g lo r y; but i n the r estiveness of
themselves, tha t unwillin g ly cont ri buting to their own
defence, mak e it necessary for their g overnors to draw
from them what t hey can in time o f peace, that they may
have means on any emergent occasion , o r sudden need , to
resist, or take advantage on the ir enemies . Fo r all men
are by nature provided of notable mu ltiplying glasses ,
that is thei r passions and self-love, through which every
little payment appeareth a great g rievance; but are destitute of those prospecti v e g las s es , namely , moral and civil
science , t o see afar off the mi s eries t ha t hang over them,
and cannot without s u ch paymen ts be avoided .
Chapt er XX
Of Dominion P aternal, and Despo t ical
. . . it appeareth plainly , to my understanding, both from
reason and Scripture, that the soverei g n power, whether
placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of
men, as in popular and aristocrat i cal commonwealths, is as
g reat as possibly men can be imag i ned to make it . And
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though of so unlimited a p ower, men may fancy many evil
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it,
which is perpetu~ war of every man agains t his nei ghbour,
are much worse . ~he condition of man in t his life shall
never be without 1nconveniences; but ther e happeneth in
no commonwealth any g r eat inconvenience b u t what proceeds
from the subject's disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from which the commonwealth has its being,
And
whosoever thinking soverei g n powe r to o gr eat, will seek
to make it less , mus t s ·~ib ject himself to the power that
can limit it; tha t is to say, t o a gre ater\
~e g rea t est objection i s, that o f t~ practice;
when men ask whe r e and when s u ch power has by subjects been
acknowledg ed . But one may ask them again, when o r where
has there been a kin g d om long f r ee from seditio n and
civil wa .
In those nations whose c ommonwealths have
been lon g-lived , and not being des troyed b ut by foreign
war, the subjec t s never did disput e o f the soverei g n
power.
But howsoe ver, an a rgument fr om t he practice of
men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact
reason weighed the cau ses and n a tur e of commonwealths,
and s uff er daily t hose miseries that proceed from the
ignorance thereof, i s invalid .
For thoug h in all places
of the world men should lay the fou ndation of their houses
on the sand, it cou ld no t thence be in f erred that so it
o ught to be .
The skill of making and maintaining commonwealths, consiste t h in c e rtain rules, as do t h arithmetic
and g eome try; no t , as t ennis-play , on practice only : which
rules neithe r poor men have t he leisure, nor men that have
had the leisure, hav e hi t herto had t he curiosity, or the
method to find o ut.
Chapter XXI
Of the Liber ty o f Subjects
. .~ut as me n, f or the attai ning of pea ce, and conservation of themselves t he r e b y, have made an artificial man,
which we call a c ommonweal th; so a l s o have they made artificial chains , called civi l laws , which t hey thems elves,
by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips
of that man, o r a ssembly, to whom the y have give n the sovereign power; and at t he other end t o t heir own ears .
These bonds, in thei r own natur e but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by t he danger, t houg h not by the
difficulty of breaking th~
In relation to these bonds only it i s, t hat I am to
speak now, o f the l i be rt y of s u b j ec ts .
For seeing there
is no commonwealth in the wo r ld, wherein the r e be rules
enough set down for t he r e gu lati n g of all t he actions and
words of men, as bein g a thing i mpossible; it followeth
necessarily, that in all kinds of a ctions by t he laws
pret ermitted , men have the libert y o f d oing what their
own r easons shall s uggest, for the most profitable to
themselves .
For if we take liber t y in the proper sense,
for corporal liberty; that is t o say, f r eedom from chains
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and prison; it were very absurd for men to clamour as
they do for the liberty they so manifestly enjoy.
Again,
if we take liberty for an exemption f r om laws, it is no
less absurd for men to demand as they do that liberty by
whi c h all other men may be masters of t heir lives. And
yet, as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not
knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them,
without a sword in the hands of a man, or ·men , to cause
those laws to be put in execution . The liberty of a subject lieth therefore only in those thin gs which in re gulating their actions, the soverei g n hath pretermitted:
such as is the liberty to buy and sell, and otherwise
contract with one another; to choose their own abode,
their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute
t heir children as they themselves th i nk fi t ; and the like.
To come now to the particulars of the true liberty
of a subject; t hat i s to say, what are the things, which
thou g h commanded by t he soverei g n, he may nevertheless,
without injustice , refuse to do; we are to consider what
ri g hts we pass away, when we make a commonwealth; or,
which is all one, what liberty we deny ourselves, by owning all the actions, without exception , of the man, or
assembly, we make our soverei g n . For in the act of our
submission consisteth both our obli g ation, and our liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken
from thence; there being no obli g ation on any man, which
ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men equally,
are by Nature free . And because such arguments must
either be drawn from the express words , I "authorize all
his actions," or from the intention of him that submitteth himself to his power, which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitteth; the obligation and liber t y of the subject, is to be derived , either
from those words, or others equivalent; or else from the
end of the institution of soverei g nty, namely, the peace
of the subjects wi t hin themselves, and their de f ence
against a common enemy .
First therefore, seeing soverei g nty by institution, is
by covenant of every one t o eve r y one; and sovereignty by
acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor,
or child to the parent; i t is manifest, that every subject has liberty in all those t hings, the ri g ht whereof
cannt ! by covenant be transferr ed .. . .
If the soverei g n command a man, thoug h justly condemn d, to kill, wound, or maimhimsel f ; or not to resist
those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of
ood, air, medicine, or any other thin g , without whic ~ he
cannot live; ~et hath that man the J j hert y to disob£¥)
If a man be interrog ated by the soverei g n, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not
ound, without assurance of pardon , to confess it; because
rna . . can be obli rr
nt to accuse
· elf ....
As for other
de en on the silence of
the law.
In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no
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rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbear, accordin g to his own discretion.
And therefore
such liberty is in some places more, and in some less;
and in some times more, in other times less, accordin g as
they that have the soverei g nty shall think most convenient.
As for example, there was a time when, in England,
a man might enter into his own land, and dispossess such
as wrongfully possessed it, by force.
But in aftertimes,
that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute
made by the king in parliament.
And in some places of
the world, men have the liberty of many wives; in other
places such liberty
not allowed....
,J.
The obli g ation
sub ·ects to the
r
is
- ~~
stood to
he ower
~~
lasteth b y wlliga a e i s a l3l e to p r ot ec t them .
For the tMI /c_y~·
..-ri ght men have by nature to protect themselves, when none (twx li::t;,.,/ d
else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. ~~~
The soverei g nty is t he soul of the commonwealth, which
~·
once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion f rom it.
The end of obedience is protection, which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his
own or in another's sword, nature app lieth his obedience
to it, and his endeavour to maintain it.
And though sovereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortal, yet i t i s in its own nature not only subject to
violent dea t h by foreign war, but also, throug h the i g norance and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very
institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by intestine discord ....
A Review, and Conclusion
To conclude, there is nothing i n this whole discourse,
nor in that I writ before of the same subject in Latin,
as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the Word of
God, or to good manners; or to the disturbance of the
public tranquiliity.
Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taug ht in the universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment
of the same belong eth .
For seeing t h e universities are
the fountains of civil and moral doctrine , from whence
the preachers and the g entry, drawing such water as they
f i nd, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and
in their conversation) upon the peop le, there oug ht certainly to be g reat care taken to have it pure, both from
the venom of heathen politicians, and from the incantation of deceiving spirits . And by that means the most
men, knowin g t heir duties, will be t h e less subject to
serve the ambition of a few discon t ented persons in their
purp oses a g ainst the sta t e, and be the less g rieved with
the contributions necessary for their peace and defence;
and the g overnors themselves have the less cause to maintain at the common char g e any g reater army than is necessary to make g ood the p ublic l i berty a g ainst the invasions
and encroachments of forei g n enemies.
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And thus I have broug ht to an end my Di scourse of
Civil and Ecclesiastical Government, occasioned by the
disorders of the p resent time, withou t partiality, without app lication, and without other desi g n than to set
before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection
and obedi ence; of wh ich the condition of human nat ure
and the laws divine, both natural and p ositive, require
an inviolable observation.
And thoug h in the revolution
of states there can be no very g ood cons t ellation for
truths of this na t ure to be born under (as having an
angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old government,
and seeing bu t the backs of them that erect a new), yet
I cannot think it will be condemned at t his time either
by the public judg e of d octrine, or by any that desires
the continuance of publ i c p eace.
And in t his hope I return to my interrup ted speculation of bodies natural,
wherein , if God g ive me health to fin i sh it, I hop e the
novelty will as mu c h p lease, as in the doctrine of this
artificial body it useth to offend.
For such truth as
opposeth no man's profit nor p leasure is to all men
welcome. *

(

The terms by which monarchy was restored to Eng land in
1660 are important.
Charles II (1 660-1 68 5) a g reed to subscribe
to Magna Carta and the Petition of Ri g ht, and to accept the
reli g ious settlement which P arliament would make.
He a g reed
informally not to interfere with parliamentary economic policies.
The last vesti g es of feudalism were formally abolished
i n 1660, thus depriving the king of any possibili t y of gaining
i ncom~ from that source.
The kincr
ro · d a re ular inc~ , which was made lar g e enou g h for him to ma i nta i n a sizable
court.
However, it was not
icient to Jermit him to follow
olic of his own devisin g , ~ did it allow him to
apg a ge in lar g e-scale rl ery to g ain his ends.
It is evident
that in return i n g to monarchy responsible Eng lishmen had not
yet deprived the king of all independent power.
There was in
effect what amounted to a ~ tleman's a g reement between Cha!} es
II, who asserted that he did not want t o pack hi s bag s i n
fli g ht any more, and the la
d ar i s
now firmly entrenched in P arliament.
This a g reement worked as long as the
king and P arliament were in basic accord with each other.
gparles !~was a pleasure-loving prince whose escapades
led English society in a reaction a g ainst the decade of Puritan
severity.
But he was at heart an absolutist who was determined
to push his latitude under the g entleman's a g reement as far as
possible without actually breaking the pact.
He quarreled with
and dissolved Parliaments as his father had done and was always
looking for alternative sources of revenue.
For many years, in

* Adapted from Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: or The Matter, Form and
Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical anarCTVTl (London_:___ --George~outled g e and Sons, 1885), pp . 31~, 63-67, 8 2, 84-89,
99-101, 102-105, 320.
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return for a pro-French forei g n p olicy , he was g iven an annual
secret subsidy by Louis XIV, in whose court he had g rown to
manhood . Furthermore, harles had strong Ca tholic leanings.
He opposed the reli g ious se
ement rna e y
e An g lican Parl .iament in the 1 660's, with its discr i minations against those
who refused to conform to t he Church of Eng land. The king himself was rece ·
t he
Catholic church on ~il cl.~ athbed in 168 5.
Charles was s u cceeded by his brother, ~ James II (1685-1688),
who had been an avowed Catholic for many years. · A serious debate ~had taken place during f e
a t e r years of the preceding
rei g n over whether James should be allowed t o succeed to the
throne at all . One g roup, which acquired the name J ory~ de:
fended the monarch _and James, althoug h it was primarily Anglican .
e o er g roup , ca - -ed the Whi gs, was varied in its
composition but ~ ni t ed in cham£i oning_ arliamentary supremacy
d in its fear o f a C~ihQJ~~c kipg. Th ey dia not e 1eve
at
~ king could be loyal to Eng land, faithful to the political and
reli g ious set t lement of the 1 6 60 1 s, and p roperly wary of France
(now considered to be th~ chie f forei g n foe) while at the same
time being a Roman Cat h olic.
During his rei gn of three years James II did nothing to
quiet Whi g fears or to i nspire much confidence in the Tories.
He p roceeded to violat e the provisions of the reli g ious settlemen t and acted g ene r ally in an arbitrary manner.
The event
which finally preci p itated revolution was the uoe ~ ted bi th
of a son in 1688 to th§..~g} e-a g ed king a :qg f?.jJ~. Ca.j;.holic , ~en .
Before the month was out a moveme ·
a
der
~ to invite
~ames' Protesta ~on=in=~ng land .
This son-in-law was
the ruler of the Uni t ed Provinces, ~~e. His wife,
Mary, was the Protestan t dau g h t er of James by a previous marriage . When in November 1688 Will i am arrived in England with
an army, much of the king' s army deser t ed. James himself fled
to France and William entered London .
In Februa ~ y_JJ&&a_ arliament
r oc aim ~~and Mary
j_oint §_Q.Yereigns of Engla11.d, a f ter declaring that
......___
King James the second, h aving endeavored to subvert the
constitution of the k i ngdom, by breaking the original
contract between k ing and people; and, by t h~ advice of
Jesuits and other wicked persons, having violated the
fundamental laws; and having wi thdrawn himself out of the
kingdom; has abdicated the g overnment, and ... the throne
is thereby vacant .
These events constitute the GJor iQus Re y ol yti on in English
history.
It was g lorious in the sense that few lives were lost
and a ~inimym of bitterness g enera!~d; but even more important,
it was g lorious in t he a a ditional sense that it m ~s ih ~
achievemen ~ o f constitutional g mreromen t jp E !;!:gla~ : ~he Engl is h const · ~U- ·on is not a s ·
·
:t, similar to
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th e American constitut ion of 17 87 . Rather it is a body of laws
and cu stoms by which t he Eng lish o rdered thei r political life.
And at this time the body of laws was changi ng because the English wished to make certain important features of their constitution very explici t .
Both absolu te and divine- rig ht monarch
of the ast 1n
g_la d . Without the consent o
king could not make or re~l laws, ev
, or maintain a
standing army . To ~inimize his control of the m11 1 ary,
arl iament be g an voting appropriations and the power to discipline
the army for only one year at a time . To r emove his control of
the judiciary Parliament provided that judges should have fixed
salaries and life tenure, and that they could be removed only
by action of both houses, and not by the k ing . In 1701 the ~ct
of Settlement provided that ithou t the conse
f P arliame ~
the king eu
leave t he emu
,
ol ve En la
ar,
or- ap oint fo r ei g ne r s to offi e . The ki_ng_ and hi s consort; had
t o e Protestants . And, f inally , in the same act P arliament
prescribed the line of succession t o the t hrone after the death
of the childless Wi lliam, passing ove r many Catholic claimants
to settle on a suitable Protestant heir .

(

One by one the list of rights guarant eed to Englishmen by
formal legi slative ena ctment g rew .
In 1689 the Toleration Act
g ranted all non-Catholic Trinitarians the righ t to public worship, although it limited officeholding to Anglicans .
In practice even those grou ps discriminated against worshiped as they
pleased. Censorship was allowed t o lapse in the 1690's . When
William and Mary came t o the throne, they were asked to subscribe to a Declarat ion of Ri g hts, which was incorporated into
law as the Bi ll o f Rights J n December 1689 , The reader mi ght
compar e the following excerpt from it with parts of the French
Declar ation of the Rights o f Man and o f the Citizen (1789) and
with the American Bill o f Rights ( 1791 ) :
Whereas the late King James the Second, by the assistance of dive rs evil counsellors, judges and ministers
employed by him, did endeavour t o subvert and extirpate
the Protestant reli g ion and the laws and liberties of this
kingdom ;
By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with
and suspending o f laws and the executi on of laws without
consent of Parliament;
By commit ti n g and prosecuting divers worthy prelates
for humbly petitioning to be excused from concu rring to
the said assumed power;
By issuing and causing t o be executed a commission
under the great seal for erecting a cour t called the Court
of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes;
By levying money for and to th e us e of the Crown by
pretence of prerogative for o ther time and in other manner
than the same was granted by Parliament;
By raising and keeping a s tanding army within this
kingdom in time of p eace without consent of Parliament,
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and qu arter ing soldiers c ontrary to law;
By causing several g ood s u bjects being Protestants to
be disar med at the same time when papist s were both armed
and employed contrary to law;
By violating the freedom of election of members to
serve in Parliament;
By prosecutions in the Cour t of Ki ng ' s Bench for
matters and causes cognizable only in Parliament, and
by divers othe r arbitrary and illegal courses;
And whereas of late years partial corrupt and unqualified persons have been r eturned and se rv ed on juries in
trials, and parti cularly divers jurors in trials for hi g h
treason whi ch wer e not free holde r s;
And excessive bai l hath been r e quir ed of persons committed in c r iminal cases to elude the benefit of the laws
made fo r the liberty of t he subjects ;
And excessive fin®s have been imposed;
And illegal and c rue l punishments inflicted;
And several grants and promi ses made of fines and forfeitures befor e any c onvict i o n o r judgment against the
persons upon whom t he same were t o be levied;
All of which are utter ly and directly contrary to the
known laws and s tatutes and freedom of t his realm; ...
. . . [ the] Lords Spi r itual and Temporal and Commons,
p urs uant to t he-i r -respec-t.i ve le-t-ters and elections, being
now assembled in a f u ll and free r epresentative of this
natio n, taking into the ir most se ri ou s c onsideration the
best means for attaining the ends aforesaid, do in the
first place ( as their ancestors in like case have usually
done ) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient
rights and liberties declar e
That the pretended power o f suspending of laws or
the executi on of laws by r e g al a u thority without consent
of Parl i ament is illeg al;
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or
the execution of laws by re gal a thority, a s it hath been
assumed and exe r c i sed of late , i s i lle g al;
That the commis s i on f o r e r ecting t he late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes, a nd all other commissions and court s o f like nature, are i llegal and pernicious ;
That levying money for o r to the u se of the Crown by
pretence o f prer o gative, wit hout grant of Parliament, for
long e r time, o r in othe r manner t han t h e s a me is or shall
be gr anted, is ille g a l ;
That it is t he right of the s u bjects to petition the
kin g , and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are ille g al;
That the rai sing o r keeping a standing army within the
king dom i n time of peace, u nless it be wit h consent of
Parliament, is a g ainst law ;
That the subjec ts which are Pro t es ta nts may have
arms for thei r defence s uitable t o their conditions and
as allowed by law ;
That elec ti on of members of Par liament oug ht to be free;

IX

p. 54

That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings
in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in
any court or place out of Parliament;
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted;
That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned;
and jurors which pass upon men in trials for hi gh treason
oug ht to be freeholders;
That all g rants and promises of fines and forfeitures
of p articular p ersons before conviction are illegal and
void;
And that for redress of all grievances, and for the
amending, streng thening and preserving of the laws, Parliaments ought to be held frequently . ... *
John Locke (1632-1704), in the preface to Two Treatises of
Government (1690), expressed the hope that his ~orts would oe
sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer,
our present King William-- to make good his title in
the consent of the people, which, being our only one of
all lawful g overnments, he has more fully and clearly
than any prince in Christendom; and to ·ustif
o the
~ the people of Englan9 whose love of their just and
natural ri g hts, with their resolution to preserve them,
saved the nati
it was o
sl

On the face of it, then, Locke appears as an apologist for
the Glorious Revolution, which Hobbes had not lived to see and
which he would not have sanctioned had he survived. Born to a
middle-class family which had fought on the side of Parliament
during the Civil War, Locke received a g ood education, and for
a time was a tutor at Oxford. He was interested in philosophy,
science, and practiced medicine. He spent many years of his
life as physician and secretary to the chief Whig nobleman,
going with him to Holland when the noblemanfell out of favor
with Charles II. Locke was in Holland when the Glorious Revolution be g an, returning to England on the boat carrying the new
queen.
It was at this time that he published the three books
on which his fame as a writer primarily rests, the ideas for
which he had been developing for many years. Letters on Toleration appeared in 1689, the same year in which the ToTerat~on
Act was passed . An Essay concerning Human Understanding and
Two Treatises on GOvernment fpllowed in the next year. Locke
spent the finar-years of his life in government service and
retirement.

*

Andrew Browning, ed., English Historical Documents, 1660-1714
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), VIII, 122-~ -u5ed
with permission.
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John Locke was more than an a
e~l
revol u tion .
s we s a
see in the following chapter, he was
a ls o more than merel a ~L!.O.li.:ti,.c~ iter . In seeki;ng to explain ,his yonvictjon t hat r evol uti on is sometimes justiJ ied, he
cove r ed much t he same gr ou nd that Hobbes -h ad covered befor e him;
the state of natur e , the contract, society and g overnment.
In
so doing , he con tri bute d mightily to t he ideas of the American
Revolution and the American political tr ad iti on . Beyond that,
he has been one of the surest wellsp r ings of political liberalism in Western Civilization .
The first o f the two trea ises is a refutation of the
theory of the di · e ~g ht of __~~ which t he steps taken by
Par 1amen had thoroughly discredit ed in England.
The excerpt
which follows is fr om The Second Treatise of Civil Government
(1690 ) :

Chapte r II
Of t he State o f Nature
4 . To u nde r st and political powe r right, and derive
it from its o riginal, we must cons ide r what state all men
are
u all in, and that is a state of perfect freedom
to
o
r
de
r their
ac t..i,Qns
i s ose of their ..,ossessio"D:§
..:.;::_..;::.=..:::.:::..:::;__=.
-= .:.::.-.=.:- _ a.ll
~
-and persons as t hey thi Dk fit, withi;n the bounds of the
raw of nature, wit hou t af3king leave or depending upon the
will of any othe r man .
~ta te alsn~~ty; wherein all the power and
j u ri sdiction is r eci r
1 , no one having mo re t han anothe r; there being nothing mor e evident than that creatures of the same sp e cies and r ank, promiscuously born to
·all the same adv ant ages of nature and the use of the same
facu l ti es , shou ld also be equal one amongst another withou t subordination o r subjection; unless the lo r d and
master o f them all shou ld , by any manifest declaration of
his wi ll, set o n e abo v e another, and confer on him by an
evi d en t and clear app ointment an undoubt ed ri ght to dominion and sove reignty . . .. .
6 . But ~gou gh . this · be ~ a s ta te o.f ~ l i.Q.¥.tl~ , yet it is
J~.ot a s tat¥. o :L_U:cince; thou g h man t n that state have an
uncont r oll able liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet b_e has 1 not libe rt y to d estroy himss ¥ , __Q1:_
so much as any c r eature i n his possession, but where some
nobler u se than its b a re preservation calls for it.
The
/
state of nature has a law of na ty ~ to g overn it which
/l L, /"
obliges eve r y one ; _..and r eason,_ wlh ch is that law, teach§ S ~/c;~ /
all mankind who wi ll bii'Fciii'ISu l t it ~t, - being afi e_gual
1
d independent,
o one
h t _ to har
·
- . · h is L ife,
f
health
-1
' o r p ossessions ; for men being a
e
wor anship o f - one 0111
o ent and infinitely wise Maker
-- a ll the servants of one sove r ei g n master, sent into
the wor ld by his order, and about his business -- they
are h i
erty whose wor kmanshi
the _ ~r e, :p1ad,e. to la~..t
d'Ur i g lU..§ n L..orle-a.~.o.tbe r 1 s, JJleasur~ :. and being furnished with like f acult ies, sharing ail in one community
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The Glorious Revolution had placed the ultimate responsibility of governing England in the hands of Parliament, but it
did not provide the executive machinery through which Parliament could perform that task.
Such machinery developed g radually in the century after 1689.
King William (1689-1702) found
it convenient to choose his ministers from the party having a
parliamentary majority. With few exceptions, his successors
followed this p ractice.
Charles II had met with his advisers
in a small room called a cabinet.
This term caught on and was
soon applied to the chief royal ministers.
The reign of William, himself a believer in absolute monarchy, was dominated by war with France. One of the results of
the Glorious Revolution was a reorientation of English foreign
policy against France.
In order to g et the necessary financial
support from Parliament, Wi lliam was satisfied not to antagonize that body over domestic affairs.
His successor was his
sister-in-law, Anne (1702-1714), who was the last Britis.la-m-enarch to use the
GW - •
In accordance with the Act of Sett-r
, upon her death the throne passed to the elector
of Hanover, who ascended the throne as George I (1714-1727).
George much preferred to live in Germany, where he was an absolute monarch, and never learned to speak English.
Neither he
nor his son, Georg e II (1727-1760), was popular in England.
These royal Georges were tolerated because they were Protestants
at a time when there was an active Catholic Stuart pretender to
the throne and also because they generally left control of the

*

Jphn Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas I. Cook
(The Hafner Li orary of ClassiCs) (New York:
Hafner Publishing
c~ 194 7) pp. 122-1~, 127, 129, 133-137, 184-186 , 188-196,
203-204, 233-238, 24 6-247.
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government in other hands.
Because Geor ge I was frequently absent from England and not
consistently interested in day-to-day affairs when he was present, he stopped attending meetings of the Cabinet.
But someone
had to be responsible for exercising leadership in the Cabinet
and representing it before Parliament. Between 1721 and 1742
that function was performed by Sir Robert Walpole (1676-1745) ,
who held the title of Chancellor of the Exchequer and F i rst Lord
of the Treasury. Walpole is considered to have been the first
prime minister of Eng land. During his long tenure he was able
to dominate the Cabinet, setting a precedent by forcin g the
dismissal of several ministers who opposed his polic i es. He
was also the leader of the Whig party, which then had a majority in Parliament. But he owed his original appointment and
his continuance in office to the king .
George III (1760-1 8 20) was the first of the Hanoverian monarchs to have been born and reared in England. He was proud of
his native country, and this pride was reflected in his popularity when he came to the throne. Early in his reign George
attempted to chang e the direction which Eng lish political dev elopment was then taking . There is no evidence that he wanted
to upset the distinguishing features of the British political
system as they had appeared since 168 9.
He wanted to become an
active a g ent of g overnment:
first, by picking and controlling
his ministers; and second, by building up, through bribery and
patronage, a party of the "king's friends" in Parliament.
This attempt by Geor g e III reached its climax during the
ministry of Lord North (1770-17 8 2). During that time some members of Parliament decided that the royal effort should be
checked.
In 17 8 0 the House of Commons resolved that the "influence of the crown has increased, is increasing , and ought to be
diminished . "
In 17 8 2 a resolution was presented expressing a
lack of confidence in the North Cabinet.
It failed of adoption,
but when the threat was made to introduce it again, Lord North
resi g ned. England had now virtually achieved a system called
cabinet , or parliamentary , government. This is a system in
which the working executive, which in this case is the Cabinet,
headed by a prime minister, is responsible for its authority
and its tenure to the legislature. The details of this arrangement remained to be worked out during the next half century of
British constitutional history, but the main outlines were already clearly evident.

